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State Forester’s Foreword 
 
The Highway 31 Fire far exceeded the impact of the other 2,001 wildfires the Forestry Commission responded to during 
the 2009 wildfire season and was easily the largest wildfire since 1976.  The $50 million in damage was the greatest of 
any past wildfire.  Its impact was only surpassed by past wildfires that claimed the lives of firefighters and citizens. The 
fire response involved agency personnel from every part of the state, either on the fireline or providing valuable support 
to the firefighting effort. The extreme fire behavior, inaccessibility, and complexity of the Highway 31 Fire made it very 
difficult to control and put the lives of citizens, firefighters, and other first responders in great jeopardy.  
 
Within a few hours, what started as a small woods fire became the worst wildfire in South Carolina’s history. Highly 
volatile, continuous fuels, dry weather, strong winds, and unusual weather events combined to create a powerful force of 
nature that was unpredictable, resulting in 76 homes destroyed, 97 homes damaged, destruction of many other 
structures and vehicles, plus much business lost by the surrounding community. The home owners lost heirlooms, 
important documents, family photos, and other belongings, but thankfully, no loss of life or serious injuries occurred.  
 
During the initial attack, the unusually rapid growth and spread of the fire made it difficult for agencies to stay in contact 
and share information. While emergency coordination involving multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and disciplines was very 
difficult, Horry County, the City of North Myrtle Beach, and the Forestry Commission worked together to ramp up 
operations quickly and ultimately establish unified command on April 23. This process allowed the responding agencies 
to coordinate communications and operations during the rapidly growing event.  
 
No single agency can adequately handle a wildfire or any other natural disaster of this magnitude. The Highway 31 Fire 
response was indeed a cooperative effort, involving more than 700 individuals from more than 20 different agencies. 
Many of these agencies had never responded to a large wildfire, but they effectively brought their experience in dealing 
with other natural disasters to bear during this event. Some agencies were not familiar at all with the Forestry 
Commission, its responsibilities, or wildfires in general, but during the course of the fire, working relationships were 
developed. The Commission will continue to build on these experiences and relationships to improve coordination, 
communication, and response capabilities.  
 
As a result of this incident, the Forestry Commission has reviewed its policies, procedures, and staffing levels to assess 
its ability to respond to such catastrophic events and to help prevent their occurrence.  Strengths and weaknesses have 
been identified and will be reported to the agency’s Board of Commissioners and state leaders. Several legislators and 
others asked what could be done to prevent and respond to such incidents. The answer to this question is to maintain 
an intensive communications and outreach program for the public and decision makers on wildfire hazards and 
prevention, and to ensure that the Commission and its partners are properly staffed and equipped for normal emergency 
response conditions while also having the buffer capacity needed to handle unusual conditions like that encountered 
with the Hwy 31 Fire. 
 
The Forestry Commission’s mission is defined by State law and can be summarized as being required to protect and 
develop the state’s forest resources. The Commission supports the forest industry, which is the state’s largest business 
manufacturing segment with regard to both number of jobs and wages paid.  Forestry is also the largest industry 
segment regarding overall economic impact with an average wage that is 35% higher than the state’s average, propping 
up per capita income. Given these facts, the Commission and the state’s forests are critical strategic resources to South 
Carolina’s economic health and well being. 
 
Our state’s forest resource is at record levels of timber volume and growth offering a unique opportunity to grow its 
economic impacts and number of well paying jobs. With adequate funding, the Forestry Commission will lead in seizing 
this growth opportunity while protecting the forests, property, and lives from catastrophic events like the Hwy 31 Fire. 
 
Best regards, 
 
 
 
Gene Kodama 
State Forester 
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Executive Summary 
 
Prior to April 22, the 2009 wildfire season in South Carolina was very mild. Between July 1, 2008 
and April 21, 2009, the Forestry Commission responded to 1,796 wildfires statewide that burned 
9,792 acres, significantly lower than the five-year average. Fire occurrence in the days leading up 
the Highway 31 Fire was low across the state, and the Keetch-Byram Drought Index , an index used 
to determine forest fire potential, [ranging from 0 (no moisture deficit) to 800 (absolutely dry)] was 
93.  
 
The Forestry Commission was requested by Horry County Fire-Rescue to respond to a small wildfire 
just after noon on April 22, 2009. The fire grew rapidly over the next 36 hours, and ultimately 
burned 19,130 acres, destroyed 76 homes, damaged 97 additional homes, and caused two 
firefighters to deploy fire shelters and three firefighters to retreat to a safety zone to avoid serious 
injuries. The extreme behavior led to the evacuation of more than 2,500 residents before it was 
declared controlled on May 20. Agency expenditures related to the Highway 31 Fire totaled 
approximately $1.5 million. Estimated losses to insured property exceeded $25 million, and damage 
to timber is estimated at approximately $17 million.  
 
The Highway 31 Fire was the worst wildland-urban interface fire in the history of the state, and 
represents the largest mobilization of SCFC resources to a wildfire on record. The rapid rate of 
spread and extreme fire behavior of this fire presented many challenges to the agency, and this 
review has identified 63 issues and 76 recommendations to address them. The key findings of this 
report include: 
 
 Interoperable communication with other responding agencies is crucial. The SCFC should 
ensure that agency firefighters have direct communication with fire departments, law 
enforcement agencies, military assets, and other public safety agencies that may respond to 
wildfires.  
 
 Annual exercises should be conducted in Horry County and other counties in the state where 
the potential for large fires exists. These exercises should test the interoperability of 
communications equipment, establishment of unified command, information sharing, and 
public notification of threats from rapidly moving wildfires.  
 
 The Forestry Commission should continue the development of qualified incident 
management teams. Additional training and experience are needed in many functional 
areas, including operations, plans, finance, logistics, public information, and safety.  
 
 Scarcity of personnel or firefighting equipment did not directly impede the Forestry 
Commission’s response to the Highway 31 Fire, because it was the only large wildfire 
occurring near populated areas at the time. In the future, a lack of equipment replacement 
funding, the loss of experienced personnel due to budget reductions, and the difficulties in 
recruiting and retaining qualified personnel could have serious impacts on the agency’s 
response capability. The occurrence of multiple large fires will easily exceed Forestry 
Commission response capacity and likely result in major loss of homes, forest assets, and 
possibly lives.  
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The extreme fire behavior, rapid spread, and unpredictability of the Highway 31 Fire resulted in 
catastrophic losses of timber, homes and belongings, and it is miraculous that no citizens, 
firefighters, or public safety officers were killed or seriously injured during this massive 
mobilization of resources. The Forestry Commission has already implemented many of the 
recommendations identified in this report, and will continue to learn from this event and improve 
the ability of the agency to fulfill its wildfire control mission.  
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Introduction 
 
The Forestry Commission was requested by Horry County Fire-Rescue to respond to a two acre 
wildfire on Woodlawn Drive off of Hwy 90 in Horry County at 12:22 pm on April 22, 2009. Within 36 
hours, this fire would burn 19,130 acres, destroy 76 homes, damage an additional 97 homes, and 
become the worst wildland-urban interface fire in South Carolina’s history.  
 
At its peak, the fire was consuming 1,100 acres per hour, spreading at more than 2.4 miles an hour, 
and had flame lengths of approximately 270 feet. More than 150 SCFC personnel were involved in 
the response, including 47 tractor plow units, 3 aircraft, 4 firetracks, the Type 2 Incident 
Management Team, staff from headquarters, dispatch, and staff from all three regions. The Highway 
31 Fire represents the largest mobilization of SCFC resources to a wildfire on record.  
 
In addition to the SCFC response, more than 579 other individuals responded, including personnel 
and apparatus from Horry County Fire Rescue, North Myrtle Beach Fire and Rescue, and 203 
firefighters from 33 other departments across the state that were requested to assist Horry County 
Fire Rescue through the South Carolina Firefighter Mobilization Plan. The Forestry Commission 
requested aerial suppression assets from the SC Army National Guard, and 5 UH-60 Black Hawk 
helicopters with bambi buckets were deployed, including 4 from the NC Army National Guard. The US 
Forest Service provided a P3 Orion air tanker to conduct retardant drops.  
 
Many other agencies provided valuable support to the incident, including Horry County Emergency 
Management Department, Horry County Police Department, SC Department of Transportation, SC 
Emergency Management Division, SC Department of Natural Resources, and the SC Department of 
Public Safety. The American Red Cross coordinated with other volunteer organizations to provide 
food and water to firefighters and evacuees.  
 
Agency expenditures related to the Highway 31 Fire totaled approximately $1.5 million. Estimated 
losses to insured property exceeded $25 million, and damage to timber is estimated at 
approximately $17 million. The fire was contained on April 28, and was declared controlled on May 
20, 2009.  
 
In order to present the pertinent issues in a single document, after action issues were obtained from 
the following sources: 
 
 SCFC large fire review, as required by agency policy 
 
 SCFC Incident Management Team After Action Review Report 
 
 Highway 31 Shelter Deployment Report 
 
 After Action Review report for the Highway 31 Fire, conducted by the Lowcountry Incident 
Management Team 
 
 Atlanta NIMO Team report: Support To The Highway 31 Fire 
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 Notes and input provided by the following cooperating agencies: 
 
o Horry County Fire-Rescue 
o North Myrtle Beach Fire and Rescue 
o North Myrtle Beach Public Safety Division 
o Horry County Emergency Management 
o SC Army National Guard 
o SC Department of Natural Resources 
o SC Department of Transportation 
o SC Department of Public Safety 
o SC Emergency Management Division 
o Horry County Police 
o USDA Forest Service/SC Coordination Center 
o SC Department of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation (Firefighter Mobilization) 
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Significant Events 
 
Initial dispatch:  Horry County dispatch contacted SCFC dispatch at 12:22 pm on April 22, 
requesting assistance with a 2 acre woods fire on Woodlawn Drive. Two tractor 
plow units and a forester were dispatched.  
 
Initial size-up: The first SCFC aircraft arrived over the fire at approximately 1 pm. Size-up 
provided by the pilot indicated that the fire was approximately 150 acres, 
running east along Hwy 90, and spotting 3-400 yards ahead of the main fire. 
The pilot also indicated that unbroken fuel was present ahead of the fire for 5-
6 miles.  
 
Fire weather: Afternoon fire weather readings, from the SCFC weather station at Marion on 
4/22: Temperature 64, relative humidity 26%, winds NW at 17 mph, 1 hour 
fuel moisture 11, KBDI (drought index) 93, burning index 14.  
 
Shelter deployments: During the evening hours on 4/22, active fire behavior was observed. The spot 
weather forecast (obtained at 8 pm) predicted favorable conditions to support 
direct attack with tractor plows overnight. At approximately 9 pm, a wind shift 
occurred and the fire made an intense run to the north. As a result, two 
firefighters deployed their fire shelters in a power line right of way, and three 
other firefighters remained in a safety zone while the fire burned around them. 
After this short-lived run, fire behavior moderated somewhat. 
 
Fire blow-up: During the late evening hours, the fire was burning intensely but well away 
from populated areas, and an attempt was made to install firebreaks to stop 
the forward spread of the fire. At approximately 1:47 am on 4/23, an 
unpredicted weather event occurred that caused the fire to intensify and blow 
up, sending firebrands more than a mile ahead of the main fire into the 
Barefoot Community. As a result, 76 homes were destroyed, 97 additional 
homes were damaged, and numerous outbuildings and vehicles were 
destroyed.  
 
Burning Ban: Because so many SCFC resources (experienced personnel and the most 
reliable equipment items) were committed to the Highway 31 Fire, a statewide 
burning ban was issued at 10 am on April 23. The ban was lifted on 4/27. 
 
Fire Contained: April 28, 2009 
 
Fire Controlled: May 20, 2009 
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Wildfire History of the Area 
 
The area burned in the Highway 31 Fire, generally known as the Buist Tract, has a long history of 
large wildfires. The Buist Tract is a largely undeveloped area located between Hwy 544, Hwy 90, and 
the Intracoastal Waterway. In the interior of the tract, there is little or no infrastructure. The terrain 
consists largely of Carolina Bays with peat soils that contain highly flammable vegetation, including 
wax myrtle, bay trees, and other species. While several roads have been constructed in the area, 
much of the tract is still difficult to access. Most of the acreage is managed for timber and wildlife 
management, including over 8,700 acres in the Lewis Ocean Bay Heritage Preserve, owned by the 
SC Department of Natural Resources.  
 
The lack of roads, deep, mucky peat soils, and thick vegetation make it difficult for firefighting 
equipment to operate safely and efficiently in the area. The fuels present in the area (primarily 
evergreen shrubs with pine overstory) are known to burn very intensely and support rapid fire 
spread. Torching, crown fires, and long-range spotting are common in this fuel type.  
 
Since the 1970s, rapid development has occurred around this tract, creating what firefighters call 
the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI). This area, where homes, businesses, or other developments are 
constructed adjacent to forests that are prone to wildfires is particularly dangerous for firefighters 
and those living and working there. Numerous large wildfires have occurred in this area, including 
the largest wildfire in South Carolina’s history, the 1976 Clear Pond Fire.  
 
 
Large Wildfire History - Buist Tract 
 
Year  Fire Name      Acres Burned 
 
• 1954  Bombing Range Fire     10,162  
• 1966   Rambi Raceway Fire             625  
• 1967   Longs Crossroads Fire   1,200  
• 1967   Socastee Plantation Fire    6,005  
• 1976   Clear Pond Fire   30,000  
• 1981   Cotton Patch Bay Fire   2,500 
• 1996   Forestbrook Fire        844  
• 2001  Long Bay Fire     1,911  
• 2002   Legends Fire     1,658  
 
Table 1: Large wildfire history of the Buist tract in Horry County. While many of these fires burned 
large areas of forestland, it should be noted that no homes were lost in any of these wildfires. 
Development in and around the Buist Tract has continued to increase, placing more homes and 
lives in the line of fire.  
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Command Staff and Incident Management 
 
The initial response to the Hwy 31 Fire consisted of two tractor plow units and one forester. The 
forester was the initial Incident Commander (IC), followed by a supervisor from Horry County. The Unit 
Forester arrived on scene and notified dispatch that he had assumed IC role, which he retained 
during the afternoon and evening of April 22. The Hwy 31 Fire was developing rapidly during the 
initial hours of the response, presenting incredible challenges for the IC. The initial actions consisted 
of structure protection efforts, with SCFC personnel working collaboratively with responders from 
Horry County Fire & Rescue. While line level personnel worked together effectively, true unified 
command was not in place during the initial attack phase of this incident, due to rapid fire spread 
and a lack of available personnel.   
 
Because of the fire history in the area, familiarity with the fuel type, and the difficult operating 
conditions present in the fire area, the IC 
requested the SCFC type 2 Incident 
Management Team (IMT) to manage this fire. 
The IMT was en route from the SCFC 
headquarters before 8 pm. Pee Dee 
Regional personnel secured space at the 
Horry County Solid Waste Authority 
headquarters and established an incident 
command post (ICP) in the late evening of 
4/22, and the SCFC IMT arrived at 10:30 pm 
for a briefing. Based on the predicted 
weather for the following day and anticipated 
fire behavior overnight, the IMT was 
scheduled to assume control of the fire at 
the beginning of day shift operations on April 
23.  
 
As additional SCFC resources arrived on-scene, the incident command structure began to develop. 
Foresters and supervisors were assigned to various roles, including strike team leader, public 
information officer, logistics, and plans. By 7 pm on 4/22, sixteen agency tractor plow units were 
engaged in the firefight. Horry County Fire-Rescue (HCFR) established a command post at station #5, 
but initial attack SCFC resources were deployed on the fireline, and no SCFC personnel were present 
in the HCFR command post. Around 11 pm, command of the incident was turned over to two 
experienced supervisors for the night shift operations. All other resources (tractor-plow units, 
firefighters, and supervisory personnel) remained on scene throughout the night.  
 
The initial objectives, developed during day shift operations on 4/22 were: 
 Conduct structure protection in cooperation with HCFR 
 Conduct backfiring operations to shift the fire spread into undeveloped areas and away from 
residences 
 Conduct safe night operations and take advantage of the predicted favorable weather 
conditions to make significant progress on fireline construction 
 Transition control of the fire to the SCFC type 2 IMT was scheduled at the beginning of day 
shift operations on 4/23. 
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What Worked Well 
 
1. There were no deaths or serious injuries to civilians or firefighters. Firefighters were able to 
fight fire aggressively, but provided for safety first. During the evacuation, more than 2,500 
residents were successfully evacuated. Approximately 733 firefighters and support personnel 
responded to this incident. The safety success during this incident can be attributed to the 
leadership and initiative of firefighters in their effort to protect lives and property in a safe 
manner. Firefighters took appropriate independent action where possible to assist in the 
evacuation of the Barefoot Community and to minimize structure loss.  
2. The initial attack IC was very familiar with the area, the fuel types, and the past history of large 
fires. This knowledge, combined with his experience, allowed the IC to make excellent 
decisions during the first few hours of this incident. Backfires were used effectively to reduce 
the threat to homes along Highway 90 and to turn the head of the fire into undeveloped 
areas. Several hours later, a backfire was effectively used to reduce the threat to homes along 
Highway 31.  
3. During the initial hours of the fire, Pee Dee Region personnel performed support roles (Public 
Information Officer, Logistics, Plans) and established an ICP. 
4. The Duty Officer at SCFC headquarters and the Incident Commander for the IMT worked to 
contact team members and coordinate the IMT deployment.  
5. Liaison officers (LOFR) were placed in both the Horry County Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) and the North Myrtle Beach EOC by 9:30 am on 4/23. This aided in communications, 
information sharing, and interagency cooperation. The Liaison Officers were particularly 
effective sharing information regarding the fire status, road closures, and air operations.  
6. Incident Command System (ICS) structure was increased in scale as the incident developed. 
The on-scene IC recognized the potential for an extended, multi-day incident and ordered the 
type 2 IMT. The type 2 IMT scaled up according to the needs of the incident, and reduced 
staffing as the incident decreased in complexity.   
7. The Atlanta National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) offered assistance to the 
SCFC IMT and three NIMO members arrived on 4/24. The NIMO staff brought valuable 
expertise to the Safety, Logistics, and Finance areas, providing coaching & training.  
8. Command of the incident was transferred from the Type 2 IMT back to the Pee Dee Region on 
4/29/09. 
 
Command Staff Issues 
 
1. A lack of available personnel in the vicinity of the Hwy 31 Fire, combined with additional 
wildfires in the area (1,087 acre fire in Georgetown County, 325 acre fire in Williamsburg 
County) increased the amount of time necessary for additional resources to arrive. Some 
tractor plow operators were on mandatory furlough (unpaid leave) as a result of severe 
agency budget cuts and were not immediately available for dispatch, and others were on 
regular days off. Additional support was requested from other counties, but travel time 
increased as a result.  
2. During initial attack, there were insufficient personnel available to fill all of the ICS roles. 
Safety officers were not identified, and an ad hoc team was formed to fill other roles 
(information, logistics, plans, etc). The initial attack IC also performed operations functions 
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and did not designate an operations 
chief.  
3. Coordination was not maintained 
between the incident and SCFC 
dispatch, leading to confusion over 
what resources were assigned to 
the Hwy 31 Fire and which were 
available for dispatch to other 
incidents.  
4. Status/check-in was understaffed 
initially and I-Suite (resource and 
cost tracking software) was not 
working, leading to difficulties in 
resource tracking.  
5. Expertise was not available in 
several key areas, including field 
observer, documentation unit leader, and demobilization unit leader, computer technical 
specialist, etc.  
6. Liaison Officers were deployed to the emergency operations centers for Horry County and the 
City of N. Myrtle Beach. However, the Liaison Officers were not equipped with adequate 
communication equipment (800 mhz radios, etc).  
7. Unified command was not established until the late afternoon of 4/23. During the initial 
response, HCFR had many more personnel on scene than the SCFC due to resource availability, 
travel time, etc. HCFR established a command post, but during the initial hours, SCFC had no 
personnel available to locate at the HCFR command post. After the type 2 IMT responded and 
assumed command of the incident, the SCFC established an ICP at a separate location, and 
HCFR maintained a separate ICP. In addition, N. Myrtle Beach established an ICP at station #5 in 
the Barefoot Community and had no representation at either of the other ICPs during the first 
day. A consolidated incident action plan was not produced until day shift on 4/24, after unified 
command between the SCFC, HCFR, and NMBFR was established. 
8. Because of a lack of capability to reproduce large quantities of the Incident Action Plan (IAP), 
some line supervisors and agencies did not receive copies or have immediate access to this vital 
document.  
9. The SCFC Type 2 IMT did not immediately incorporate the Lowcountry type 3 IMT into their 
organization.  
 
Command Staff Lessons Learned  
 
1. Request IMT and other additional support as soon as possible. Recognizing incident potential 
can help reinforce the strength of the command structure. When a high potential incident is 
recognized, fire managers must be proactive in establishing a complete command structure. 
Failure to recognize the potential of a incident to overcome resources available locally can lead 
to reduced command and control.  
2. The Incident Commander for the IMT should make sure team members are clear on their 
position and assignments.  
3. The training and experience acquired as the SCFC has established the type 2 team proved 
invaluable during the Hwy 31 Fire. The agency needs to continue the IMT development process.  
4. SCFC IMT should participate in exercises to practice incorporating other IMTs into the command 
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structure. There should be a coordinated 
effort to merge resources into a unified 
command as soon as possible during an 
incident.  
5. During the initial hours of a wildfire, SCFC 
overhead resources (Liaison Officer, Public 
Information Officer, etc) are not normally 
available to place at the fire department 
incident command post, and the SCFC 
incident commander is  handling operations 
functions on the fireline from a mobile 
command post (type 6 engine). To enhance 
communication between responding agencies 
and speed up the formation of unified 
command, the SCFC IC should request that a representative from the county fire department ride 
in the command vehicle. As additional overhead personnel arrive, the SCFC  and fire department 
will establish a joint incident command post to ensure that unified command is possible. 
 
Command Staff Recommendations 
 
1. On future incidents, the resource unit leader should coordinate with dispatch daily to keep them 
informed regarding personnel and equipment assigned to an incident.  
2. Additional personnel should be identified and trained to assist with status/check-in. These 
resources should be dispatched early in the incident to ensure that all personnel and equipment 
assigned to the incident are documented.  
3. Fire staff and incident commanders should identify key positions that the SCFC needs to develop 
expertise in, including demobilization, documentation unit leader, computer technical specialist, 
field observer, and other positions. Personnel should be recruited and trained to perform these 
roles.  
4. Additional personnel need to receive training for liaison officer position, and equipment needs 
should be identified. Liaison officers should work to develop & maintain contact lists for each 
county in the state, and be prepared to dispatch to county or city emergency operations centers 
during a large incident.  
5. Initial attack incident commanders need additional training to help them recognize the potential of 
wildfires, and to become more proactive in establishing a complete command structure early on in 
the incident.  
6. Establishing unified command with other responding agencies should always be considered an 
immediate, high priority task.  
7. A contract should be developed to supply a high-capacity copier to the incident command post 
whenever an IMT is dispatched. The IAP should be made available to all responding agencies, and 
should be provided to all single resource bosses on the incident.  
8. Through exercises and training, the SCFC IMT should practice transitioning from the initial attack 
to extended attack, and incorporating other IMTs into their organization.  
9. IMT should meet at a central location and travel to the incident as a group if possible. 
10. IMT should receive a thorough briefing from the Initial Attack IC and the Regional Forester before 
departing for the assignment. This will allow the IMT to conduct some planning while en route.  
11. Duty Officer and dispatch should contact team members not deployed with the initial IMT to 
make them aware of the situation and determine their availability.  
12. IC should designate a point of contact to provide information to the SCFC Duty Officer.  
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Public Information 
 
During the first 48 hours of this incident, there were significant challenges in getting timely information 
regarding the SCFC firefighting efforts to the public via traditional media. In the initial response, there 
was a lack of personnel available, and the Public Information Officer (PIO) role was not filled. This was 
overcome when a forester was designated to be the initial PIO. When the IMT arrived, additional 
resources were ordered to help handle the large volume of requests for information from the media.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. Those tasked with PIO responsibilities possessed innate talent for relaying complicated fire 
information to the public. PIO staff consisted of an excellent combination of local knowledge, 
media knowledge, and overall wildfire and forestry education experience.  
2. Once the IMT was in place, information flow to the public occurred regularly, and updated 
information was provided to local, state, and national media outlets.  
3. This incident attracted tremendous local and national media attention. Public information staff 
handled numerous requests, ranging from national news outlets to local print media. As fire 
activity decreased, PIO staff took advantage of “teachable moments”, stressing the importance 
of defensible space and the Firewise program.  
4. Media tours of fire activities were well-received.  
5. This assignment provided an excellent training and learning experience for agency PIOs.  
 
 
 
Public Information Issues 
 
1. There is an inherent lag time between 
the arrival of the IMT and its ability to 
get accurate and helpful information 
out to a worried public.  
2. The volume of requests for information 
and media assistance was 
overwhelming during the first 48 hours 
of the incident.  
3. While the focus on information flow 
was on traditional media outlets, 
opportunities exist to better utilize 
web-based information sharing 
(YouTube, social networking sites, etc) 
more effectively.  
4. Command & General Staff need to 
acknowledge the importance of providing updated information to PIO staff so the flow of 
information can be maintained.  
5. The agency webmaster was deployed to the incident in a finance section position. As a result, 
the agency web page was not kept current during the initial days of the incident.  
6. Inciweb was not utilized during the Hwy 31 Fire. This important tool can help disseminate 
information to other state, local, and national response agencies, in addition to providing 
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updated information to the media.  
7. The IMT deployed with only one PIO. The most experienced PIO was not dispatched, and the 
PIO with less fire experience was quickly overwhelmed.  
8. No Joint Information Center (JIC) was established with Horry County and N. Myrtle Beach. This 
led to confusion among the media and inconsistent messages in news releases.  
 
Public Information Lessons Learned 
 
1. In exercises and training, Command & 
General Staff need to exercise the 
transfer of information to the PIO to 
facilitate frequent, accurate updates to 
the media as an incident unfolds.  
2. Multiple PIOs need to deploy when the 
SCFC IMT is dispatched. If the incident 
does not require multiple PIOs, they can 
be released.  
3. On large incidents, a JIC should be 
established, especially when multiple 
agencies and jurisdictions are involved. 
This will result in a more consistent 
message to the media.  
 
Public Information Recommendations 
 
1. Designated SCFC personnel across the state should receive some level of PIO training so they 
can assist with media relations until an IMT arrives. 
2. A need was identified to train more personnel to update the agency web page to keep it 
current during deployments, since many media sources check the SCFC web page for 
information, graphics, and images 
3. PIOs need to receive training and experience using web-based information sharing outlets 
more effectively. 
4. IMT members need training and experience utilizing Inciweb to publish current incident 
information 
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Safety 
 
There was no designated safety officer on April 22. This can be attributed to a lack of personnel 
available to fill this role at this time. With limited overhead resources available locally, strike team 
leaders, division supervisors, and the incident commander assumed the role and responsibility of the 
safety officer position.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. The Hwy 31 Fire was a remarkably safe operation, resulting in no significant injuries to 
firefighters, other responders, or the public.  
2. Over 2,500 residents were evacuated safely from the Barefoot community.  
3. More than 150 SCFC personnel responded to this incident, with no significant injuries 
reported.  
4. Air operations included SCFC aircraft, five Army National Guard Blackhawks, and a USFS air 
tanker. Air space was managed 
effectively and safely using a 
designated air operations manager.  
5. Firefighters responded and fought fire 
aggressively, but provided for safety 
first. 
6. There was good communication of 
safety hazards to all incident 
personnel.  
7. Line Safety Officers were beneficial and 
provided excellent information to the 
Safety Officer. 
8. The Atlanta NIMO Team Safety Officer 
provided valuable coaching and 
assistance, particularly with the review 
of the fire shelter deployments.  
9. After the initial period, enough additional resources were available to allow for adequate work/
rest cycles.  
 
Safety Issues 
 
1. The first two tractor plow units to arrive on the scene conducted size up then attempted to 
conduct a burnout operation to protect a structure. As one firefighter left his unit to begin the 
burnout, firebrands ignited vegetative material inside the cab of the tractor plow unit, resulting 
in significant damage to the tractor. No injuries resulted.  
2. During the afternoon of 4/22, civilian aircraft interfered with air operations. A temporary flight 
restriction was requested, but was not in effect until after dark.  
3. During the initial operational period, fire weather predictions proved to be inaccurate. 
4. During the late evening hours of 4/22, 5 tractor plow units were directed to begin a firebreak 
on the left flank of the fire in thick bay vegetation. After a wind shift, two of the tractor plow 
operators were overrun by fire and deployed their fire shelters. The other three operators 
constructed a safety zone, where they remained until the fire passed around them.  
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5. Smoke created traffic hazards on Hwy 90, Hwy 31, Hwy 22, and several other local roads 
throughout the incident.  
6. In the initial attack period, SCFC resources did not have direct communications with Horry 
County resources.  
7. There were limited personnel available to staff dedicated Safety Officer positions until the 
SCFC type 2 IMT assumed command of the fire.  
8. Span of control was difficult to maintain during the initial attack period due to a lack of 
available overhead personnel.  
 
 
Safety Lessons Learned 
 
1. The need for air space restrictions 
occurs infrequently in South 
Carolina. Additional clarification of 
the temporary flight restriction 
process is needed to ensure they 
can be requested and enacted 
without delay.  
2. All personnel involved in the shelter 
deployment and retreat to the 
safety zone were wearing all 
appropriate PPE. Several of these 
operators indicated that fire shelter 
training contributed to a calm 
deployment.  
3. Personnel involved in the shelter 
deployment and retreat to the 
safety zone maintained their situational awareness, allowing them to foresee potential fire 
conditions, take time to construct safety zones, locate the best deployment location, and 
maintain constant communication during the event.  
4. A new employee involved in the deployment stated that being around experienced personnel 
who stayed calm allowed him to stay calm as well.  
5. The SCFC has been fortunate and has not had serious injuries or fire shelter deployments in 
many years. The training and mentoring provided by the NIMO Team Safety Officer on NWCG 
burnover and entrapment protocols, interview techniques, and report development were very 
beneficial.  
6. Weather updates should be provided periodically and shared with all firefighting resources 
7. During erratic fire behavior, the affected employees stayed in groups and maintained 
communication with their supervisor and other employees.  
 
Safety Recommendations 
 
1. Maintain equipment properly to ensure that vegetative material is not allowed to accumulate 
in the cab or pan. This increases the safety of the operator and reduces the chance that 
firebrands will cause equipment fires. Firefighting equipment should be parked or staged in 
safe areas, away from firebrands.  
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2. Work with the FAA and SCFC pilots to clarify and document the process for requesting 
temporary flight restrictions. Ensure that SCFC duty officers are aware of the process.  
3. Ensure all SCFC employees complete annual fireline safety refresher training that includes 
information regarding safety zones, escape routes, and fire shelter deployment practice. 
Ensure all personnel use appropriate PPE, including new generation fire shelters 
4. All supervisors should review Operational Leadership responsibilities (in NWCG Incident 
Response Pocket Guide) on an annual basis 
5. Establish a standard procedure to ensure that all resources are given a briefing upon arrival at 
a fire, using the IRPG 
6. Establish a routine or automatic transmission of weather 
conditions/predictions on extended attack incidents 
7. Ensure initial attack resources give accurate size up to 
SCFC dispatch upon arrival at a fire using the SCFC size up 
report form.  
8. SCFC supervisory personnel should review the Tactical 
Watch Outs (p. 5 in the IRPG) annually 
9. Safety Officers and SCFC Duty Officers should receive 
training and become familiar with accessing/activating 
Critical Incident Stress Teams for use when fatalities and/or 
serious injuries occur.  
10. Safety Officers and SCFC Duty Officers should become 
familiar with protocols for securing and inspecting the scene 
of deployments, serious injuries, or fatalities, and proper 
procedures for transferring evidence (shelters) to the USFS 
Missoula Technology Development Center.  
11. Fund and develop staffing to ensure the availability and 
timely implementation of an incident safety officer.  
12. Safety Officers should be supplied with a cache of safety 
items for the line (hard hats, gloves, earplugs, etc).  
13. A review of safety procedures should be conducted to 
address fighting fires in the wildland/urban interface 
14. Safety Officers should take additional classes (Food Unit 
Leader, Medical Unit Leader, Helibase Manager, Base Camp 
Manager, etc) if possible to facilitate safety inspections.  
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Operations 
 
On 4/22, the Incident Commander (IC) filled the role of the Operations Section Chief (OSC). After the 
transition to night shift, a Deputy OSC position was filled. When the type 2 IMT assumed command 
of the fire, an OSC was deployed and a Deputy OSC position was filled on 4/24. SCFC and fire 
service personnel filled operational positions, including division supervisors, strike team leaders, 
engine bosses, and other positions.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. The Initial Attack IC recognized the extreme fire behavior and potential for fire growth and 
ordered additional resources quickly, including additional tractor plow units, supervisors, and 
the IMT.  
2. Backfires were used effectively 
during the initial attack to 
protect structures along Hwy 
90, and to reduce the intensity 
of the fire as it approached Hwy 
31.  
3. Burnouts were successfully 
conducted to remove unburned 
fuel inside containment lines.  
4. Spot weather forecasts were 
requested several times during 
this incident. These forecasts 
helped determine appropriate 
fire suppression strategies and 
tactics.  
5. As fire activity moderated, 
demobilization was initiated for unneeded resources.  
6. Resources were used and allocated efficiently. Tractors and firetracks were assigned to 
areas where the equipment would be most effective.  
7. Inexperienced firefighters were paired with experienced firefighters to gain valuable hands-on 
knowledge. Taskbooks were initiated where appropriate.  
 
Operations Section Issues 
 
1. The Operations Section Chief (field ops on this incident) and the Deputy Operations Section 
Chief (planning ops on this incident) had some difficulty in sharing information gathered 
during visits to the fireline in time to have that information gathered for use in developing the 
IAP. This was overcome by having “tailgate” meetings between the OSC and Deputy OSC.  
2. Night operations on 4/22 were based on information provided in the spot weather forecast 
obtained from the National Weather Service (NWS) around 8 pm. This spot weather forecast 
did not predict the unusual weather event that occurred during the overnight hours.  
3. During the initial days of the incident, the OSC had some difficulty getting an aerial view of 
the fire. After more air resources arrived, observation flights helped gather information used 
to develop tactics for the IAP.  
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4. Some incoming resources indicated that they did not get a briefing upon arrival.  
5. The protocol for requesting road closures should be clarified. While local law enforcement 
agencies can close roads for short periods, long-term road closures must be enacted by the SC 
Department of Transportation.  
6. SCFC tractor plow units encountered heavy traffic and had difficulty getting to the fire, 
particularly in areas where road closures were in effect.  
 
Operations Section Lessons Learned 
 
1. On large incidents, it is extremely 
important to have a field ops and 
planning ops, with one functioning 
as the Operations Section Chief, 
and one as Deputy Operations 
Chief. This enables them to make 
sound decisions based on field 
observations.  
2. During extended attack incidents, 
the field ops and planning ops 
should take turns filling each role. 
This will improve their 
understanding of field conditions 
and the planning process. 
3. Road closure decisions were made 
jointly by all agencies involved, 
based on progress by firefighters 
and a discussion about which roads would likely be affected by smoke overnight. The presence 
of a Liaison Officer in the Horry County EOC was essential to this process.  
4. Air support should be requested as early in the incident as possible. SC Army National Guard 
aircraft should be requested in pairs to accommodate pilot work/rest schedules and ensure 
aircraft availability during the entire operational period. 
5. Operations Section should look forward and set trigger points to request additional air support. 
This will allow SCANG time to plan for additional air assets and move them to staging areas 
sooner.  
6. Some resources were unfamiliar with the area; transportation maps would be helpful to assist 
these resources.  
 
Operations Section Recommendations 
 
1. On large wildland fires, an Operations Section Chief and Deputy OSC need to be deployed with 
the IMT.  
2. On future incidents, the SCFC needs to work with SC Department of Public Safety and local law 
enforcement agencies to develop an escort system to guide responding units through 
congested areas.  
3. The SCFC should work with SC DPS and SCDOT to clarify and exercise the protocol for 
requesting road closures. Both of these agencies indicated a lack of understanding of the 
SCFC role/mission, and therefore were not sure how to provide the best assistance during the 
Hwy 31 Fire.  
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4. Ensure that all resources are given a briefing upon arrival and at each shift change.  
5. Initial attack incident Commanders should receive training and begin to use the ICS 201 form. 
This will improve the transition from initial attack to extended attack.  
6. SCFC should work with the NWS to identify opportunities to improve the communication 
between agencies, so that NWS can provide the best possible forecasts.  
7. Operations Section Chiefs should request aerial observation flights to enable them to get a 
better overall understanding of the incident.  
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Plans  
 
Until the IMT arrived, plans functions were conducted by the incident commander and SCFC dispatch. 
After the IMT assumed control of the fire, the plans section included a plans section chief, resources 
unit leader, situation unit leader, documentation unit leader, demobilization unit leader, status check-
in, GIS specialists, and field observers.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. Resources were ordered early in the incident and enabled the plans section to complete the 
necessary reports and documents on time.  
2. A documentation unit leader (DOCL) was ordered early in the incident through the 
Southeastern Forest Fire Protection Compact. This proved to be a critical position to ensure 
that incident documentation was prepared appropriately.  
3. Resources in the plans section were increased and decreased according to the incident 
complexity.  
4. Horry County provided GIS staff and equipment to assist with mapping during the incident. 
County GIS staff provided mapping capability, large map printing, and access to property 
records.  
5. The Low Country IMT provided valuable assistance establishing unified command and 
producing the first incident action plan.  
6. During tactics meetings, representatives from the SCFC, HCFR, and NMBFD worked together to 
ensure that operations were unified.  
 
Plans Section Issues 
 
1. Developing an IAP for both day and night shift was a challenge.  
2. I-Suite did not work correctly when the team established the command post. This hampered 
data entry, information sharing, and development of the initial incident action plan. A computer 
should be obtained and dedicated to serve as an I-Suite server.  
3. Status Check-in and the Resources Unit Leader had to share one computer I-Suite. This slowed 
down both functions.  
4. Some trainees did not have task books when they arrived at the incident.  
5. On this incident, the Horry County EOC and the N. Myrtle Beach EOC were in operation. It was 
difficult for representatives from these organizations to be present at all briefings provided by 
the IMT.  
6. SC Army National Guard has helicopters that are equipped with forward-looking infrared (FLIR) 
capability. This technology could assist in locating hot spots, but the SCFC was unfamiliar with 
the use and application of FLIR technology at the time of this incident.  
7. IMT mobilization status was not clearly communicated to all IMT members (including 
alternates) early in the deployment.  
8. A high-speed copier was not available at the incident command post. This slowed the process 
of reproducing and distributing the incident action plan.  
9. A public address system is necessary to conduct briefings for an incident of this size.  
Plans Section Lessons Learned 
 
1. During the build up phase of an incident, additional Status Check-in personnel are necessary 
to keep up with incoming resources.  
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2. Some resources were ordered and placed in staging or at other locations (airport). Remote 
check-in would be helpful to accommodate these alternate locations.  
 
3. The IMT needs to develop more expertise in demobilization (DMOB) and documentation 
(DOCL).  
4. On incidents where unified command is established and SC Firefighter Mobilization is used to 
supply resources, it may be helpful to access Firefighter Mobilization records for resource 
tracking.  
 
Plans Section Recommendations 
 
1. Include multiple Status Check-in personnel with the initial IMT. The additional personnel can 
speed up check-in at the ICP and 
at remote locations (staging or 
airport, etc).  
2. Develop expertise in I-Suite 
support and consider deploying a 
computer technical specialist with 
the IMT.  
3. Acquire additional IMT computers 
with I-Suite installed.  
4. Acquire a computer to serve as a 
dedicated I-Suite server (since this 
incident, a server has been 
purchased for the IMT).  
5. Ensure that trainees are issued 
task books before deploying to an 
incident.  
6. Utilize SCFC dispatch to notify all IMT members (including alternates) when a deployment 
occurs.  
7. Utilize conference and/or video conferencing to offer some briefings to HQ staff, county & city 
EOCs, and other interested parties.  
8. Plans Section should review and refine the demobilization process.  
9. Conduct exercises with SC Army National Guard to develop process for utilizing FLIR technology 
to identify hot spots.  
10. Work with SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (Firefighter Mobilization) to gain 
access to Firefighter Mobilization resource information. This information would be very helpful 
for resource tracking and input into the IAP.  
11. Contract for or purchase a high-speed, high-volume copier for the IMT.  
12. Acquire a public address system for briefing( since the incident, this item has been 
purchased).  
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Finance 
 
Prior to the arrival of the IMT, finances were handled by local personnel. When the IMT assumed 
control of the incident, Finance staff began tracking costs, time, and acquiring necessary items. This 
information is essential to ensure compliance with FEMA guidelines under the Fire Management 
Assistance Grant program.  
 
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. This was the first assignment to an actual incident for most of the Finance Section. It provided 
an excellent learning opportunity.  
2. Assistance from the Atlanta NIMO Team was invaluable to the Finance Section.  
3. Records and documentation were successfully completed; this provided valuable information 
to the agency.  
 
 
 
Finance Section Issues 
 
1. I-Suite was not set up properly 
at the beginning of the 
incident. This slowed down 
data entry and complicated 
cost-tracking.  
2. Finance needs access to a 
fast printer/copier to ensure 
proper documentation is 
produced.  
3. SCFC personnel are not used 
to using crew time reports and 
shift tickets.  
4. Finance staff did not have 
time during the incident to 
audit crew time reports or shift 
tickets for accuracy.  
5. Division Supervisors (and 
other supervisors) allowed some resources to demobilize without completing all of the 
necessary documentation (crew time reports, shift tickets, etc). This made it difficult to 
complete this important documentation.  
6. Space in the ICP was limited; Finance and Check-in were set up on one table.  
  
Finance Lessons Learned 
 
1. SCFC needs to maintain a sufficient supply of crew time report and shift ticket forms.  
2. Supplies, including dry erase boards, flip charts, and bulletin boards should be carried to 
incidents.  
23 
 
Highway 31 Fire After Action Report 
3. An example crew time report and shift ticket should be included in the IAP to help responders 
that are not familiar with these documents.  
4. Finance staff needs additional assignments to become fully qualified. Until full qualifications 
are met, having more experienced personnel on our incidents (NIMO Team) will help ensure 
that essential records and documentation are created.  
5. All requests for resources, supplies, and equipment should be documented on the general 
message form (ICS form 213).  
 
 
 
Finance Recommendations 
 
1. Identify and train a computer 
technical specialist to ensure 
I-Suite works properly.  
2. Provide training to SCFC 
personnel for using crew time 
reports, shift tickets, and the 
demobilization process. Begin 
to use these forms and 
processes during training and 
on extended attack incidents 
so personnel will be familiar 
with them.  
3. Contract for or purchase a 
high-speed, high-volume 
copier for the IMT.  
4. Provide training to IMT 
members, line supervisors, 
and mechanics on the use of 
General Message forms (ICS 213). 
5. Supervisors should require all resources to complete all crew time reports, shift tickets, and 
other documentation at the end of every shift and ensure all documentation is submitted 
before demobilizing from an incident. 
6. The Finance Section Chief should order and maintain a sufficient supply of crew time reports 
and shift tickets. These items should be deployed with the IMT.  
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Logistics 
 
Early during the incident, logistics was handled by regional staff, including providing food and water 
to firefighters. Resources from within the Pee Dee Region were ordered through SCFC dispatch. The 
SCFC Type 2 IMT was ordered by the Incident Commander through the Regional Forester and the 
Duty Officer.  
 
When the IMT assumed control of the incident, resource ordering was conducted by the Logistics 
Section Chief. Orders for additional resources were communicated to the SCFC duty officer.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. During the initial attack, 
logistics support was limited 
to providing food & water to 
firefighters on the line. The 
initial Logistics officer arrived 
on scene quickly and made 
adequate plans to support 
firefighters.  
2. The Regional Forester and 
Logistics officer made 
arrangements with the Horry 
County Solid Waste Authority 
to locate the Incident 
Command Post at their 
facility prior to the arrival of 
the IMT.  
3. This was the first deployment 
to a large wildfire for the members of the Logistics Section. Once the IMT was in place, 
Logistics staff made sure that firefighters were fed, provided lodging, and had adequate 
supplies, equipment and other support.  
4. Liaison Officers provided valuable assistance to the Logistics Section.  
 
Logistics Section Issues 
 
1. Food quality and quantity varied during the incident. In the early stages, food was provided by 
volunteer agencies. While this was helpful, some meals provided  did not meet the nutritional 
standards for firefighters.  
2. Until all responders were checked-in to the incident, it was difficult to ensure that enough 
meals were ordered.  
3. There was a lack of documentation early in the incident. Requests for resources, supplies, 
and equipment were not adequately documented on general message forms (ICS 213), which 
led to some confusion. 
4. No clear process exists for assigning overhead (O#) or equipment (E#) to resources.  
5. Transportation of firefighters between accommodations, staging, and their assigned division 
was an issue. Most firefighters arrived on scene in heavy transports, with no other means of 
transportation.  
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6. Both SCFC and Horry County Fire Rescue set up staging areas. Staging area managers were 
not identified. The Operations Section Chief was not always aware what resources were 
available in staging areas.  
 
Logistics Section Lessons Learned 
 
1. Nutritional standards required for firefighters should be provided to food vendors.  
2. Sufficient status/check-in personnel should be deployed with the team to ensure that accurate 
information is available to logistics.  
3. Staging areas should be coordinated with other agencies; having multiple staging areas was 
confusing to some incoming 
resources.  
4. Documentation of all requests 
is essential. All requests for 
resources, supplies, and 
equipment must be 
documented on the general 
message form (ICS form 213). 
5. Interoperability issues were 
overcome when HCFR 
provided 800 mhz radios to 
the IMT. The IMT has a cache 
of 800 mhz radios that were 
not transported to the 
incident. The IMT should 
purchase a bank charger for 
the 800 mhz radios and an 
adequate supply of extra 
batteries.  
 
 
 
Logistics Section Recommendations 
 
1. Provide training to IMT members and line supervisors on the use of General Message forms 
(ICS 213). All resource requests should be documented on these forms.  
2. Exercises should be conducted with volunteer agencies to clarify nutritional needs for 
firefighters.  
3. Need to clarify and document process for assigning overhead (O#) and equipment (E#) 
numbers to resources. This can be done at the incident or by headquarters staff.  
4. Orders for additional resources should be submitted to headquarters in writing.  
5. Dispatch several vans with the IMT when deployed to large wildfires. These vans, from the 
SCFC fleet, State Fleet Management, or rental agencies can provide transportation for 
firefighters to and from their accommodations.   
6. Additional training/positions would be beneficial in some areas, such as Food Unit Leader, 
Ordering Manager, etc.  
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State Headquarters & Fire Staff Support 
 
The function of the State HQ and Fire Staff is to provide support prior to, during, and after the 
response phase of a major wildfire. The Duty Officer was notified about the Hwy 31 Fire by the Pee 
Dee Regional Forester at approximately 1:30 pm on April 22. The Incident Commander requested the 
Type 2 IMT, and fire staff subsequently began alerting team members.  
 
Fire staff was in constant contact with region personnel and the IMT during the afternoon hours on 
4/22. Initial actions consisted of filling requests for additional tractor plow units, spot weather 
forecasts, dispatching the IMT, and requesting a temporary flight restriction over the Hwy 31 Fire. 
Later actions included securing approval to use SC Army National Guard air assets and filling requests 
for resources submitted by the IMT.  
 
 
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. Orders from the incident were 
filled, using agency resources 
from other regions and the 
Southeastern Fire Compact.  
2. The SCFC Type 2 IMT was 
requested during the early 
afternoon on 4/22. The IMT 
arrived on-scene at 
approximately 10:30 pm, with 
plans to assume control of the 
incident at the beginning of day 
shift operations on 4/23.  
3. Aviation assets were requested 
from the SC Army National 
Guard, including 1 Blackhawk 
from SC and 4 from NC.  
4. A US Forest Service air tanker was requested through the SC Coordination Center. The tanker 
arrived and began providing aerial retardant drops on 4/23/09.   
5. Due to interference from civilian aircraft, a temporary flight restriction was requested in the fire 
area. The TFR was in place by approximately 10 pm on 4/22. The TFR was lifted late on 4/27. 
6. The first spot weather forecast was obtained for the incident during the evening hours of 4/22. 
Additional spot weather forecasts were obtained in the following days.  
7. SCFC provided a representative to staff the ESF 4 (Fire) desk at the State Emergency 
Operations Center beginning on 4/23. 
8. Beginning on 4/23, interagency conference calls were held twice daily that included SC 
Emergency Management Division, Horry County EMD, the City of N. Myrtle Beach, SC Army 
National Guard, SC Department of Public Safety, SC Department of Transportation, and other 
agencies staffing the State Emergency Operations Center.  
9. A statewide burning ban was implemented on April 23-27 due to the large amount of 
resources committed to the Hwy 31 Fire.  
10. The Hwy 31 Fire was approved for a FEMA Fire Management Assistance Grant on 4/23.  
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State Headquarters & Fire Staff Support Issues 
 
1. Beginning on 4/23, the volume of requests for additional resources increased dramatically. 
Initially, two employees from fire staff worked to locate and dispatch additional resources from 
other regions, and later other assistance was available. Fire staff was able to fill orders, but the 
process could be significantly improved.  
2. No standard length of deployment has been established for SCFC personnel on in-state 
incidents. This led to some confusion and uncertainty for firefighters, and created some 
difficulties in finding replacement crews.  
3. Better methods need to be established to track resource orders (assignment of O# and E#) 
during large incidents.  
 
State Headquarters & Fire Staff Lessons Learned 
 
1. An improved method for processing resource orders should be developed for use during large 
incidents. Personnel should be identified and trained to assist fire staff.  
2. One individual should be designated as the primary contact for each large incident. During the 
Hwy 31 Fire, the Sandy Island Fire was also active. The Fire Chief was the primary contact for 
the Sandy Island Fire and the Protection Chief was the primary contact for the Hwy 31 Fire. 
This made it easier to track orders for each fire and consolidated information for each fire into 
one point of contact.  
3. All IMT members, as well as regional foresters, unit foresters, project foresters, and 
supervisors should be notified when the SCFC IMT deploys. 
 
State Headquarters & Fire Staff Recommendations 
 
1. Identify and train non-fireline personnel to staff an expanded dispatch during large wildfires or 
other events.  
2. Develop protocol for assigning overhead numbers (O#) and equipment numbers (E#) for 
resources ordered. This can be done by Logistics personnel at the incident or in expanded 
dispatch at State Headquarters, but a clear protocol should be developed.  
3. Regular interagency conference calls, including the SCFC, SCEMD (and appropriate ESF 
representatives), and the county agencies involved in the response should be initiated as soon 
as possible during large incidents. These calls promote information sharing and can help 
resolve issues that arise between jurisdictions and response disciplines.  
4. A standard length of deployment  should be developed for in-state assignments of SCFC 
personnel, and included in agency procedures.  
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Interagency Communications 
 
Due to the rapid spread of this fire, communication between responders and communication of fire 
size and spread information to agency administrators proved to be difficult.  
 
This section will also address communication of fire intelligence among response agencies.  
 
What Worked Well 
 
1. During the initial hours of the 
fire, personnel from Horry 
County Fire-Rescue and the 
SCFC worked side by side to 
conduct structure protection 
along Hwy 90.  
2. The placement of Liaison 
Officers in the Horry County 
EOC and the N. Myrtle Beach 
EOC was very successful. The 
Liaison Officers provided 
information to these agencies 
regarding fire spread, fire 
suppression strategies, and 
road closures, air operations, 
and other crucial items.  
3. Once unified command was 
established, incident action plans were prepared for each operational period.  
 
Interagency Communication Issues 
 
1. The Hwy 31 Fire impacted multiple jurisdictions and involved several different agencies with 
different types of radio communication systems. Interoperability was a major issue, especially 
during the initial attack.  
2. N. Myrtle Beach utilizes an 800 mhz radio system, and the SCFC does not have these 
frequencies.  
3. Existing mutual aid radio channels were not appropriately utilized during this incident.  
4. Some agencies had difficulty obtaining direct phone numbers to the SCFC Command Post.  
5. Until Liaison Officers were placed in the Horry County EOC and N. Myrtle Beach EOC, there 
was sporadic information flow to these agencies.  
6. There is no single method available to quickly communicate the threat of a wildfire to 
surrounding communities.   
7. Some agencies did not receive incident action plans (IAP) in a timely manner, especially in the 
initial days of the incident.  
8. Resources ordered by HCFR and NMBFR through the SC Firefighter Mobilization were tracked 
separately from other resources, making it difficult to incorporate them into the IAP.  
9. SCFC normally establishes 12 hour operational periods and personnel work on 12 hour shifts. 
Fire service resources operated on shorter shifts. This resulted in a change of personnel on 
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the fireline during the middle of the operational period and uncertainty over call signs, 
resource status, etc.  
 
 
Interagency Communication Lessons Learned 
 
1. A true unified command was not achieved until late on 4/23. While line firefighters from both 
the SCFC and HCFR 
communicated face to face, 
there was no single set of 
strategies. Establishing a 
true unified command as 
early as possible in the 
incident would prevent 
many problems.  
2. Liaison Officers placed in 
the Horry County EOC and 
N. Myrtle Beach EOC 
provided a critical link 
between the SCFC and 
these agencies.  
3. Liaison Officers from the SC 
Army National Guard should 
be dispatched with 800 
mhz radios on future 
incidents. At the time of this incident, SC Air National Guard Blackhawks did not have 800 
mhz radios installed.  
 
Interagency Communications Recommendations 
 
1. Establish true unified command as soon as possible.  
2. Utilize all available assets during future large wildfires, including the SC National Guard 43rd 
Civil Support Team and the SC Division of Information & Support Technology communications 
van to help overcome interoperability issues.  
3. Create and distribute a phone list to all involved agencies, including direct phone numbers to 
the ICP.  
4. Investigate alternative ways to communicate the threat of a large wildfire, smoke on roads, 
and other hazards to municipalities and citizens, including internet based methods and social 
networking.  
5. SCFC should ensure that agency 800 mhz radios are programmed to allow communication 
between various agencies, including the use of existing mutual aid channels (800 mhz and 
VHF). The City of N. Myrtle Beach and SC Army National Guard are equipped with 800 mhz 
radios, and the SCFC should ensure that common channels are identified and programmed. 
Since this incident, HCFR has provided key SCFC personnel with 800 mhz radios programmed 
to work on their system.  
6. Personnel should be designated to man radios in the ICP to ensure that incoming radio traffic 
is monitored.  
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7. Training should be conducted for SCFC employees to ensure that firefighters understand the 
capabilities and operation of their radios.  
8. Conduct exercises to practice and improve interoperability between agencies, utilizing 
common channels that are clearly identified.  
9. When structural fire resources are ordered to a wildfire through the SC Firefighter Mobilization 
Committee, a field representative from the SC Firefighter Mobilization Committee should be 
incorporated into the IMT.  
10. SCFC and Firefighter Mobilization Committee should develop training to help fire service 
recognize the transition from initial attack to extended attack incidents.  
11. Shift lengths for each operational period should be coordinated between the SCFC and fire 
service partners.  
12. SCFC should dispatch personnel (Liaison Officers) to represent the agency as soon as fire 
service establishes an incident command post. This is especially important when fires occur in 
areas where terrain (mountains, boggy conditions), fuels (bays, swamps), or presence of high-
value resources (homes, infrastructure) indicate that an extended attack is likely.  
13. Liaison Officers should develop and maintain lists of contacts for other agencies (county fire 
departments, county emergency management, and local law enforcement agencies) in fire-
prone areas.  
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Training Opportunities 
 
The Highway 31 Fire response has helped identify areas where additional training or exercises is 
needed.  
 
1. An annual table-top exercise should be conducted that involves the SCFC, Horry County Fire-
Rescue, North Myrtle Beach Fire & Public Safety, Horry County Emergency Management, SC 
Department of Transportation, SC Department of Public Safety, Horry County Police, SC 
Emergency Management Division, the SC Army National Guard, and other emergency 
response agencies in the area. This exercise should test communication systems, 
interoperability, unified command, information sharing, public notification, and other areas. 
Every agency involved in the review of this incident indicated willingness to participate in an 
annual exercise.  
2. SCFC should continue to conduct annual training with the SC Army National Guard. 
3. SCFC personnel need additional training on the use of 800 mhz radios.  
4. SCFC personnel need training on the use of crew time reports and shift tickets.  
5. SCFC should examine the need for the development of expertise in several areas that may be 
helpful on future incidents. These include Documentation Unit Leader, Computer Technical 
Specialist for I-Suite, Situation Unit Leader, Field Observers, Air Attack Manager, and other 
positions.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Highway 31 Fire was the most destructive wildfire in South Carolina’s history and resulted in 
devastating losses of homes, vehicles, personal belongings, timber, wildlife habitat, and other 
assets. Fire behavior was extreme, placing hundreds of firefighters and thousands of residents in 
danger, either from direct flames, smoke on roads, breathing difficulties, falling trees, heat 
exhaustion, and fatigue. Throughout the incident, the safety of responders and the public was the 
highest priority, and no serious injuries occurred. 
 
This large wildfire provided a valuable learning experience to the Forestry Commission and all other 
responding agencies. The incident tested the capability of the SCFC and identified areas for 
improvement at all levels of the organization. The lessons learned on the Highway 31 Fire, from 
those learned by the first resources dispatched through the completion of this AAR, will be used to 
help improve agency response for years to come.  
 
Adequate Forestry Commission 
personnel and equipment were 
available for the Highway 31 Fire 
because fire activity at the time 
was at an historic low, the other 
two significant fires on April 22 
and 23 were nearby, and only 
experienced personnel with the 
most reliable firefighting 
equipment were sent to this fire. 
The success in dealing with the 
fire masked the inadequacies in 
wildfire suppression capacity that 
currently exist and are worsening 
rapidly due to staffing cuts and 
very old equipment. Under severe 
fire conditions, the Commission’s 
capacity would not have been adequate, and many more homes and much more timber would have 
been lost, with a high probability of death or serious injury to citizens and firefighters. The lack of 
appreciation for the wildfire threat that exists in the state and long-term budget reductions have had 
a devastating effect on the agency’s response capacity. In the future, insufficient equipment 
replacement funding, the loss of experienced firefighters, and difficulties in recruiting and retaining 
qualified personnel will have further serious impacts on the agency’s response capability.  
 
Forestry Commission leadership will continue to review the findings of this report and work to 
ensure that the necessary changes to policies, procedures, strategies, and tactics are implemented. 
The SCFC is committed to learning from the Highway 31 Fire and using the lessons learned to 
improve preparedness, planning, response, and recovery efforts in the future. The Commission and 
its allies will also continue to push for adequate staffing and equipment funding and seek 
alternative sources to be able to meet its firefighting mandate as stated in SC Code of Laws Section 
48-33-40. 
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Appendix A: 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
 
DOCL  Documentation Unit Leader 
EOC  Emergency Operations Center 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FLIR  Forward Looking Infrared  
FOBS  Field Observer 
FSC  Finance Section Chief 
GIS  Geographic Information System 
HCEM  Horry County Emergency Management 
HCFR  Horry County Fire-Rescue 
HCPD  Horry County Police 
IAP  Incident Action Plan 
IC  Incident Commander 
ICP  Incident Command Post 
ICS  Incident Command System 
IMT  Incident Management Team 
IRPG  Interagency Response Pocket Guide 
JIC  Joint Information Center 
KBDI  Keetch-Byram Drought Index 
LOFR  Liaison Officer 
LSC  Logistics Section Chief 
NIMO  National Incident Management Organization 
NMBFR North Myrtle Beach Fire and Rescue 
OSC  Operations Section Chief 
PSC  Plans Section Chief 
SCANG South Carolina Army National Guard 
SCEMD South Carolina Emergency Management Division 
SCDOT  South Carolina Department of Transportation 
SCDPS South Carolina Department of Public Safety 
SCFC  South Carolina Forestry Commission 
SCLLR Sout Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation (Firefighter 
Mobilization Committee) 
SOFR Safety Officer 
TFR Temporary Flight Restriction 
USFS United States Forest Service 
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Appendix B: 
 
Highway 31 Fire Progression Map 
 
 
